Head and HAHR's Full Report on the Hacienda
Luisita Massacre
Report of the Health Team on the
Hacienda Luisita Massacre
A paper submitted by Health Alliance
for Democracy (HEAD)
and Health Action for Human Rights
(HAHR)
to the SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR
(12 January 2005, Philippine Senate)
Introduction
On November 6, 2004, over 5,000 workers
and agricultural laborers of Hacienda Luisita began a strike
in order to highlight their demands for higher wages and
better working benefits and conditions, as well as signify
their disgust over the company’s union-busting and unfair
labor practices. These were the main issues that have
worsened their already miserable plight.
At the backdrop is the long-standing
problem of land. Despite the coverage of the hacienda under
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) in 1987, the
Cojuangcos, who were the landowners of the hacienda, opted
for the Stock Distribution Option (SDO). SDO was one of the
non-land transfer schemes that made the CARP beneficiaries
supposedly “part-owners” of the land while virtually
maintaining their status as workers or agricultural
laborers. Hence, this historical failure to implement the
fundamental principle of “land to the tiller”, which is the
social justice aspect of land reform, set the tenor for the
current struggle within the hacienda.
Immediately after the strike was set,
two attempts were made by the local PNP to break the
picket-line and disperse the strikers: the first on the
evening of November 6 itself and the second on the morning
of November 7. Both attempts failed as the number of
strikers and their families and supporters swelled to
thousands and bravely defended their positions.
The Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), through Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas, then took
over the issue through the “assumption of jurisdiction” and
immediately issued a “return-to-work” order on November 10.
After being largely ignored, Sec. Sto. Tomas then issued an
order on November 15 “deputizing” the AFP Northern Luzon
Command (NOLCOM) to assist the Philippine National
Police-Region 3 and local DOLE officials in enforcing the
“return-to-work” order.
Hence, on November 16, even though the
union leaders were still exhausting all avenues of
negotiations with the Cojuangcos, a combined force of an
estimated 700-strong provincial and regional PNP and 17
truckloads of fully-armed soldiers from the 69th Infantry
Battalion Philippine Army (PA) and the 33rd Light Armor
Company PA stationed at the NOLCOM entered the vicinity of
Gate 1 near the picket-line. They were accompanied by two
V150 armored personnel carriers (APCs) and two fire trucks.
The dispersal of the strikers outside
Gate 1 began at around 3:00 p.m. when the AFP and PNP
started shooting teargas canisters into the strikers’
positions. One of the APCs even tried to crash over the
barricades set by the strikers in Gate 1. After failing to
do so, shots were suddenly heard and the strikers started to
scamper away. However, the shootings continued even after
the strikers were already fleeing. Many saw other strikers
fall even as they were already trying to run for cover or
move out of harm’s way.
At the end of the violent and brutal
dispersal, 7 people were dead and scores more were wounded,
including women and children. Many were hospitalized for
gunshot wounds (GSW) although there were also other injuries
from the mauling that ensued.
The AFP and PNP were quick to deny any
wrongdoing. They both claimed that they fired their weapons
in order to defend themselves. Congressman Benigno “Noynoy”
Aquino III and Sec. Eduardo Ermita quickly blamed the
“Leftists and militants” and alleged “agent-provocateurs”
who had supposedly infiltrated the ranks of the workers.
Cong. Noynoy only stopped short of outrightly blaming the
strikers for the violence, as the PNP and AFP were allegedly
“only trying to enforce the law.”
This investigation was conducted,
therefore, to shed light on the circumstances surrounding
the brutal dispersal in order to determine the victims,
especially the extent of damage to life and limb, and to
determine those who are accountable. This investigation also
indirectly seeks to assist the victims in their quest not
just for redress but also for justice.
Methodology
The health team was headed by Health
Alliance for Democracy (HEAD) and Health Action for Human
Rights (HAHR) and included health professionals (i.e.
physicians, nurses), health workers, and health students.
The health team conducted its
investigations in three separate occasions: November 17,
November 29, and December 4-5, 2004. The methodology
involved direct interviews and medical check-ups of those
who were injured (including those who were already
hospitalized), interviews with relatives and witnesses of
the casualties, direct inspection of the cadaver, and
interviews with local officials and medical personnel,
including Dr. Saturnino S. Ferrer, the physician who
conducted the autopsy on five of the seven casualties.
The team conducted its own
documentation, which included signed affidavits, medical
records, photo-documentation, taped interviews, and records
of direct examinations conducted by health team members. The
team also reviewed other pertinent documents available,
including review of relevant affidavits/sworn statements and
a review of available videos.
The findings are divided into three
parts: findings on the casualties, findings on the injuries,
and findings on the conduct of surrounding medical
facilities and health agencies.
Findings on the casualties
There were seven identified casualties.
These were Jhaivie R. Basilio, Adriano R. Caballero, Jr.,
Jhune N. David, Jaime B. Fastidio, Jesus V. Laza, Juancho C.
Sanchez, and Jessie M. Valdez. A summary of the information
and findings on each of the casualties is attached as Annex
A.
The bodies were brought to different
funeral parlors from the site of incidence. Valdez, however,
was reportedly brought to Camp Aquino before being brought
to the funeral parlor where the autopsy was made. There was
a gap of at least 19 hours from the time of incidence to the
time the autopsies were conducted by Dr. Ferrer. It was also
within this time gap that the alleged paraffin tests were
done on the casualties.
Based on the data gathered by the
health team, the following were significant:
All of the seven died of gunshot
wounds, contrary to the report of the Provincial Health
Office that Sanchez died of “severe head injury” and Laza
died of “basal skull fracture”.
Three (i.e. Basilio, David, and Laza)
suffered from multiple gunshot wounds while the other four
had single but fatal gunshot wounds.
Except for two gunshot wounds, both of
which were sustained by Laza, none of the 10 gunshot wounds
of the other casualties were frontal. All of the entry
wounds were either from the back or from the sides.
Two had other concomitant and
suspicious-looking injuries. Basilio had contusions and
lacerations on his face and neck areas, while Sanchez had a
peri-orbital laceration and hematoma of the left eye,
contusion hematoma over the lumbar area, and some
discoloration on the feet. These were consistent with
eyewitness accounts that the two were still alive when taken
by the PNP and AFP and were mauled before being shot.
Six of the casualties were workers of
Hacienda Luisita and all were residents of the hacienda. All
were in their productive ages and had no previous severe
illness.
Dr. Ferrer also noted “wax-like
material” on the bodies of Basilio, Caballero, and Sanchez.
However, the so-called paraffin tests were conducted without
any consent or without being witnessed by relatives of the
deceased, and even now, the document containing the actual
results of the paraffin tests are still to be obtained.
Findings on the injuries
There were at least 121 injured, 44 of
whom were seen and interviewed by the health team. Of the
total injured, 108 were male and 6 were female, while 7 had
no data on their sex. 63 were adults (between 20-59 years
old), 11 were children (below 19 years old), 4 were of the
geriatric age group (above 60 years old), and 43 had no age
data. All were either employed in or residents of Hacienda
Luisita and many were the breadwinners of their respective
families. A summary of pertinent data on the injured is
attached as Annex B.
Of the total injured, 32 were cases of
gunshot wounds (GSW), of which 18 were seen, interviewed,
and examined by the health team. Some were serious enough to
warrant hospitalization, especially those with multiple
injuries or multiple GSW. Some are still confined to various
hospitals undergoing surgery. At least 5 of the GSW cases
seen by the team still had bullets lodged inside their
bodies.
Based on the clinical histories taken,
many of injured were already running from Gate 1 when they
were hit by the bullets. The gunshot wounds were not
sustained from a single volley of fire but from a sustained
volume of fire lasting up to almost 2 minutes.
Other injuries included teargas-related
respiratory irritation, fractures (of the bones),
contusions, abrasions, and lacerations, and contusions from
blunt trauma. Most of these injuries were from the use of
around 100 teargas canisters and from the ensuing stampede
due to the shooting. However, at least two (one with
multiple fractures and one with a fractured right hand) were
the result of being repeatedly bludgeoned by the PNP with
their riot sticks after the shooting.
Findings on the conduct of hospitals
and health institutions
Based on data obtained by the health
team, St. Martin de Porres Hospital, which is the nearest
hospital from the site of incidence, being less than 300
meters away from Gate 1, transferred its existing
in-patients at least a day before the incident occurred.
Moreover, even before the violent dispersal was implemented,
the hospital was secured by elements of the Army, aside from
the PNP contingent earlier sent there to secure the hospital
entrance. Also, Army medical personnel were already
stationed in the hospital even before the shooting occurred.
The health team also finds the report
of the Provincial Health Office (Annex C) to be flawed. For
instance, one of the casualties, Juancho Sanchez, supposedly
died of “severe head injuries” whereas autopsy findings show
that he died of a single gunshot wound penetrating the left
side near the pelvic area that hit his vital organs.
Similarly, the PHO report states that
Jesus Laza supposedly died of “basal skull fracture”.
However, the Initial Medico-Legal Report of the PNP Crime
Laboratory signed by Dr. Reynaldo R. Dave, Jr. shows no head
and neck injury and instead notes two GSW to the chest, both
of which were fatal. It merits serious consideration as to
how much weight should be given to the PHO Report given
these significant errors, and why these errors were made in
the first place.
Conclusions and recommendations
The health team finds adequate
substantial evidence to state that the strikers of Hacienda
Luisita were shot not “as a defensive stance” or because the
PNP and AFP “were provoked” but rather as a direct armed
offensive assault on the picket line. This assertion is
supported by: a) the number and types of injuries and
deaths, b) the character of the injuries and physical
findings, and c) the volume and length of gunfire sustained
against the strikers.
Moreover, the GSWs suffered by those
who were killed and injured dispel any and all allegations
that the PNP and AFP elements who fired their guns were
doing so because they were under some sort of threat. Not
even the alleged paraffin tests, conducted under dubious
circumstances by the very same agency under question, can
justify the blatant use of firearms, automatic and
high-powered at that, against unarmed civilians. These are
gross violations of the basic human rights of the strikers.
There is also no doubt that there was
an excessive use of force during the November 16 incident.
What is disturbing, however, is the fact that this excessive
use of force is deliberate and intentional. Again, the
injuries sustained by those who died and those who survived
attest to this. The types and severity of the injuries belie
any randomness and instead, point to a dangerous kind of
recklessness spurred by an overarching intent to cause or
inflict harm. There were even severe injuries due to blunt
trauma sustained immediately after the shooting. The
brutality of the dispersal thus casts a pall of shame on the
PNP and serves as a grim reminder of why the AFP is
prohibited from the picket lines.
Lastly, the findings of the health team
point strongly to an element of premeditation rather than
spontaneity (as is being alleged by the AFP and PNP), as
regards the shooting. The size of the kill zone, as well as
the volume of fire, as traced from the clinical histories,
the character of the injuries, and the positions of the
victims and casualties, all validate the element of
premeditation. The events surrounding the St. Martin de
Porres Hospital further corroborate this.
The health team, therefore, recommends
that the findings and conclusions drawn by this report be
investigated further and validated by other independent
sources. First of all, the victims should be given immediate
and adequate redress, through indemnification, of the
damages and injuries to life and limb caused upon them to
suffer.
Second, there should be a swift and
decisive accounting of the responsibility for the deaths and
injuries, not only from the AFP and PNP units involved but
also from the government agencies (viz., DOLE, DILG, DND,
and DAR) and the local government units. Appropriate
administrative and criminal charges should immediately be
filed.
Finally, if there is a genuine desire
from the current dispensation to address the root causes of
the conflict in Hacienda Luisita, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
should look closer and heed the demands of the working
masses, the workers and agricultural laborers, for land,
jobs, wages, and rights. Rather than merely dismissing this
problem as a “purely labor issue”, the GMA administration
should implement genuine agrarian reform and institute the
much needed social justice demanded by the victims.
Annex A
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON THE CASUALTIES
Name/Personal Information/Autopsy
Findings
Jhavie Basilio 20/male; single,
hacienda worker 2 GSW (1 on the chest and 1 on the left
buttocks) + contusions and lacerations on the head and neck
areas
Adriano Caballero, Jr./23/male;
married, caddie in the hacienda/1 GSW on the left side of
the chest
Jhune David 28/male; married,/ hacienda
farm worker/2 GSW (1 on the zygomatic region and 1 on the
trapezoid region)
Jaime Fastidio/46/male; married,
hacienda laborer/1 GSW on the mandibular area through the
neck
Jesus Laza 34/male; single, hacienda
worker/2 GSW on the pectoral region
Juancho Sanchez/20/male; single,
hacienda resident 1 GSW on the left pelvic area + peri-orbital
laceration and hematoma of the left eye, contusion hematoma
over the lumbar area, and some discoloration on the feet
Jessie Valdez 30/male; married,
hacienda laborer/1 GSW on the right thigh
Annex B
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON THE INJURED
Total injured: 121
Total seen by the health team: 44
All were either employed in or
residents of Hacienda Luisita
Many were the breadwinners of their
respective families
Breakdown by sex: Male – 108
Female – 6
No data – 7
Breakdown by age: Children (< 19 years)
– 11
Adults (>19 and <60 years) – 63
Geriatric (>60 years) – 4
No data – 43
No. of Gunshot Wounds (GSW): 32
GSW seen by the health team: 18
Some were serious enough to warrant
hospitalization, especially those with multiple injuries or
multiple GSW
Some are still confined to various
hospitals undergoing surgery
At least 5 of the GSW cases seen by the
team still had bullets lodged inside their bodies.
Other concomitant injuries:
1. teargas-related respiratory
irritation
2. fractures (of the bones)
3. contusions
4. abrasions
5. lacerations
6. contusions from blunt trauma
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